Hiroshima 60 Years Later

Today is the 60th anniversary of the dropping of the Atomic bomb on Hiroshima. As on the 50th anniversary, it is yet another opportune time to reasses the morality of the decision to drop the bomb, as well as the morality of nuclear weapons in general, both of which have been questioned during the interval between then and now, and which will likely continue to be debated for some time. Ironically, I am currently fulfilling my two-week reserve committment at Offut Air Force Base, near Omaha, Nebraska. This is where the planes which dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were prepped before deploying to the Pacific Theater. The hangar that was used is now the Field House, containing a track, weight rooms, swimming pool, tennis and basketball courts and an indoor hockey rink (it's a rather large hangar). As a result, there are protesters outside the main gate today, proclaiming the U.S. guilty of war crimes.

In the post-atomic age, the question of morality in war has been debated with increased fervor due to the level of destructiveness possible with nuclear weapons. Many people began to reassess the morality of the bomb, and the proper policies regarding them for the future. This necessitated a review of what is morality, how do nuclear weapons fit into a moral framework of conflict, and the unique situations that leaders find themselves in that can influence moral decisions concerning the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, a weapon in and of itself has no morality, and possession of nuclear weapons to deter war has a moral basis by saving lives. For those who accept that it is sometimes necessary to kill, but also the need to temper the means of doing so, guidelines need to be established for responsible leaders to follow when confronted by aggression.

In Christian thought, these guidelines have developed into the Just War Theory, a set of principles that can be used to judge the morality of war and actions during warfare. These are sometimes separated into the rules that govern the justice of war (jus ad bellum) and those that govern conduct in war (jus in bello). Different sources list different specific principles, but all agree that a just war must be defensive in nature, must provide immunity for noncombatants, and must use proportional means. These are the relevant principles for this discussion. The first falls under the category of jus ad bellum, while the other two are concerned with jus in bello. Arguments concerning nuclear deterrence will be judged against the former, while the use of nuclear weapons will be judged against the latter.

One thing conspicuous by its absence from the Just War Theory is a prohibition on specific weapons or weapon types. The theory only deals with how these weapons are used. Indeed, in the history of warfare, new weapons have continually evolved, with an increase in lethality being a common theme. The introduction of the Greek phalanx, siege weapons, gunpowder or the Gatling gun each revolutionized warfare, and were undoubtedly seen as “terror weapons” by those on the receiving end of these new weapons. However, none of them changed the morality of war. It was still possible to follow the principles of a Just War, or the accepted moral guidelines of the day, despite the use of these weapons. Indeed, an army wielding nothing but knives or spears could execute thousands of noncombatants, and often did. As gun control opponents like to argue, “Guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” While simplistic, in terms of morality it is relevant. One could just as easily say “Nuclear weapons don’t kill people, people kill people.” In an argument concerning morality, it is not the weapon employed, but the purpose and manner with which it is used which defines its morality.

Another aspect of the morality of nuclear weapons is the fact of their existence. Many argue that they are inherently immoral, but this is inconsistent with experience. As Colin Gray stated, the prenuclear world is lost, and cannot be retrieved. From a practical point of view, the physics and technology to build nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented. From a philosophical point of view, it could be argued that anything made possible by God cannot be immoral, only the uses mere mortals put it to. While one country could choose not to build them on moral grounds, others will choose otherwise, and could then threaten others with them. The nature of many regimes, and the documented history of failure of treaties designed to ban specific weapons, would seem to prove that contention. Even without the historical track record, to put faith in such a treaty, with the attendant risks and costs of failure, would be immoral. One thing that the Just War Theory makes clear, it is the obligation of responsible government to defend its people. This leads then to the possession of nuclear weapons and the ability to use the fact of possession to advance a moral cause.

The primary goal when possessing nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others. Additionally, nuclear weapons and threats to use them may deter conventional wars as well, if the aggressor doesn’t want to risk crossing the “nuclear threshold.” Indeed, Bernard Brodie stated that, in the atomic age, the chief purpose of the military is no longer to win wars, but to avert them. Within the Just War Theory, the use of nuclear weapons to deter aggression is clearly consistent with the principle of self-defense. In fact, it is preferable to an active defense once hostilities break out. Therefore, nuclear deterrence in this narrow view is moral. Some could argue that the risks of failure outweigh the theoretical gains of deterrence, but there is no way to resolve such a hypothetical argument. But based on the premise that nuclear weapons are not immoral, and to that leave oneself vulnerable to these weapons is immoral, then the only proper policy is to retain nuclear weapons, and to follow a policy of deterrence. Pope John Paul II himself stated “deterrence… may still be judged morally acceptable,” though with some caveats which will be discussed later.

The discussion of deterrence brings two areas of debate to the fore. One is whether nuclear targeting should be counterforce or countervalue. Since use of nuclear weapons against cities would clearly be inconsistent with Just War principles, a countervalue strategy is immoral. This was enunciated by the Reagan Administration, who felt that not only was targeting Soviet cities immoral, it was not an effective deterrence, and sought more accurate, lower yield weapons. This leads to a further discussion of deterrence, since the popular view was that mutual assured destruction (MAD) was the most stable form of deterrence, therefore while countervalue might be immoral in use, it was preferred as a deterrent policy. However, there is no evidence that relying on assured destruction was more effective than a counterforce strategy, since the Soviets could have valued their military capability more highly than its population. In a moral context, it can only be decided that counterforce must be a deterrent strategy as well as a strategy for use.

The other debate alluded to above is over the enhanced radiation weapon, commonly referred to as the “neutron” bomb. This weapon was designed as a lower blast yield, low fallout weapon. The concept was that in a war in Europe, NATO’s use of these weapons would be effective against military targets, without the level of blast and fallout caused by thermonuclear weapons. This was desirable since the battlefield would be on NATO’s home ground, and this would minimize civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure. However, despite the positive moral implications of a discrete nuclear weapon, the weapon was never developed due to opposition by those who believed that anything that made nuclear war more “attractive” was inherently destabilizing, again with no evidence.

Having established that nuclear weapons are not ipso facto immoral, and that deterrence is morally acceptable, even necessary, the next question concerns the actual use of nuclear weapons. The two relevant principles from the Just War Theory are the principles of proportionality and the avoidance of noncombatant casualties. Some believe that the level of destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so high that it is impossible to use them with any sense of proportionality. This was especially true after the development of the Hydrogen bomb, opposed by many scientists involved with the atomic program, such as Robert Oppenhiemer. However, concurrent with the development of the megaton-sized H-bomb was the development of tactical nuclear weapons, which Oppenhiemer supported. Over time, small yield weapons have been developed, which make an arguable case that limited use of nuclear weapons, in certain theaters, can be consistent with the principles of a Just War. The key would be to target military forces and infrastructure only, in situations where the collateral damage would not only be minimized, but at a level similar to that of conventional weapons. Additionally, the level of force must be proportional to the expected gain.

A prime argument against the use of nuclear weapons in a limited, tactical manner is that the enemy would be likely to reply with nuclear weapons. If they replied in a similar manner, i.e. limiting civilian casualties and proportionate to the ends desired, this is not necessarily a moral problem. However, most would argue that an enemy such as the Soviet Union would be unlikely to follow Just War principles, and since that should be anticipated, the onus is on the West not to introduce them in the first place. This argument appears persuasive, but one could argue plausibly that the resolve shown by the limited use of nuclear weapons could cause the aggressor to back down, saving lives. Either way, there is clearly little room for maneuver within a moral context. Moreover, the failure of one party to abide by the principles of Just War Theory cannot be blamed on the other. The bottom line is that to remain in the confines of the Just War Theory, use must be extremely discrete and proportionate, and escalation beyond limited use must be avoided.

The question of morality is easy to answer in hypothetical situations. The key is how it applies in the real world. Thankfully, there is only one case of nuclear weapons' use during wartime to evaluate. On 6 August 1945, the Enola Gay dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, followed three days later with another bomb dropped on Nagasaki, leading to the surrender of Japan and the end of WWII. Some aspects of the use of these bombs in WWII no longer apply to consideration of their use since then, in that there was no danger of nuclear response to inhibit their use. Therefore, calculations of escalation did not apply. In a strict interpretation of the Just War Theory, the fact that the bombs were dropped on cities appears to violate the prohibition on targeting of civilians. Additionally, the level of destruction brings the principle of proportionality into focus.

However, one must take into consideration the context of the event. The United States had previously inflicted similar scales of destruction on Tokyo and Dresden. The “moral threshold” had already been crossed. So while the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may fail the Just Cause Theory, the fact that they used atomic bombs rather than conventional bombs is irrelevant. But do the bombings violate the principle of proportionality? This principle states that the level of force must be limited to that which will secure a just peace. Total war would fail this test. In this context, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are justified by the fact that they led directly to the end of hostilities, and the securing of a just peace. While some debate the idea that the bombs were necessary to bring Japan to surrender, this is belied by the facts. If its actual use on Hiroshima did not bring the Japanese to surrender (which it didn't, necessitating the second bomb on Nagasaki), then a mere demonstration, as many suggest should have been done, would not have either. The final decision to surrender was made by the Emperor himself, only after the second bomb convinced him that resistance was useless.

Also, these cities were carefully selected due to their importance as military targets, not because they contained civilians. For example, Hiroshima was the headquarters of the southern army and depot for the homeland army. The civilian toll was due to collateral damage, and they were not purposely targeted. The principle of civilian immunity calls for distinction between noncombatants and combatants, and the indiscriminate damage from the atomic bomb could be argued that it fails this test. However, the number of civilian deaths in the two bombings, between 150-200,000, was lower than estimates at the time for U.S. combat casualties, not to mention Japanese, Russian and Chinese losses, resulting from the continuation of the war and an invasion of Japan. In the context of an event that ends a war and prevents much greater levels of death, both military and civilian, the overall equation weighs in favor of the use of the bombs, however unseemly such a calculation may be.

This discussion has shown that nuclear weapons are amoral, the possession of nuclear weapons to deter conflicts is moral, and the use of nuclear weapons in a limited manner and in certain contexts is moral. However, many policy questions are raised by this, presuming a national leader chooses to have a moral compass guiding his decisions. One moral failure during the cold war was the reliance on MAD to deter war. This created a situation where had deterrence failed, the resulting destruction was literally assured. This cannot be reconciled with morality or the Just War Theory. Therefore, counterforce targeting and deployment of low yield weapons are the only acceptable moral strategies for deterrence.

Also, what should be done when deterrence fails, and limited use is escalated? This requires using the threat of nuclear weapons to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, and the use of nuclear weapons to prevent further destruction or escalation, but without having the intention of using these weapons in a full-scale general nuclear war. As a policy, this is untenable, since the threat must be believed to be credible. The chance of a policy of “bluff” remaining secret in an open society like the United States is probably nil. However, once the nuclear threshold is crossed, and efforts to keep their use limited fail, it would be immoral for a leader to order a general nuclear strike that would destroy millions of lives, even in response to a general attack by the enemy. But while any leader might be so inclined, this could not become official policy, and his thoughts on the subject could never be revealed. This makes the “game” of nuclear deterrence very dangerous, and why ultimately a moral leader must find a way to eliminate the threat.

The Catholic Church also feels that nuclear weapons must eventually be eliminated, saying that deterrence is moral, but only as a temporary measure on the path to disarmament. This goal was shared by Ronald Reagan, who during his so-called “evil empire” speech, asked for support “of this administration's efforts to… negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and one day, with God's help, their total elimination.” In his announcement of what came to be known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, he directed the beginning of “a long-term research and development program … to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles” which “could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves.” Any policy aimed at the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons must depend on a credible defense against nuclear weapons. Anything less would invite nuclear blackmail, inevitably resulting in aggression and loss of lives and freedoms. Even in the post-Cold War era, missile defense is a prerequisite to any thoughts of eliminating the nuclear deterrence. Arguments that missile defense does nothing to defend against terrorist nuclear threats fails to account for the fact that nuclear deterrence is also useless against non-state actors. That is another issue that requires another solution.

It is the moral duty of any government to defend its people. In the nuclear age, this necessitates the careful consideration of moral principles in balancing the need to deter war, and avoiding destruction on a massive scale. This requires a nation to maintain a credible nuclear force, with a counterforce strategy using accurate and discrete weapons, and a firm policy of use when deterrence fails. However, Just War Theory demands that despite the actions of an aggressor nation, and the potential massacre of millions of people, massive retaliation cannot be justified. Therefore, efforts to eliminate the threat, predicated on a credible defense and conventional deterrence, must be sought as the ultimate solution. If a nation can create the conditions where it is not advantageous for rival nations to obtain nuclear weapons, then the goal of elimination can be realized.